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Abstract 
This chapter proposes a novel approach to measuring fund manager overconfidence. Among numerous 
behavioral biases identified in financial agents, overconfidence is perhaps most widely studied. Abundant 
research suggests that overconfidence can have a significant value-diminishing impact on financial decisions 
taken by small investors but very few studies have sought to measure the overconfidence of professional 
investors. This study covers more than 4600 US equity mutual funds and demonstrates why the proxies 
commonly used to measure investor overconfidence cannot be readily applied to fund managers, hence the 
usefulness of the content analysis approach as an alternative. A number of potential proxies for overconfidence 
including overoptimism, excessive certainty and excessive self-reference are measured across fund manager 
reports. The findings suggest that superior past performance boosts overconfidence, which is, in turn, associated 
with diminished future investment returns. In addition, word frequency analysis is conducted to shed light on the 
genre and tone fund managers employ in their investment narratives. The chapter concludes with some 
suggestions for researchers performing content analysis in finance and accounting.  
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Traditional finance often uses theoretical models that predominantly assume economic agents 
are rational, i.e., efficient and unbiased information processors who constantly seek to 
maximise their utility. It is now widely agreed that these appealingly simple assumptions are 
quite inaccurate (see e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Behavioural finance, on the other hand, 
assumes that investors are often subject to behavioural biases that can negatively affect their 
financial decisions. These biases and heuristics, which are typically grounded in the cognitive 
psychology literature, are being increasingly applied in financial contexts. Indeed, studies in 
behavioural finance often lead to conclusions that significantly resonate with what 
professionals in the finance industry experience and “know” at a deeper and perhaps 
unconscious level (Taffler and Tuckett, 2010).  
In this context, studying investor psychology is of paramount importance. Hirschleifer 
(2001), among others, provides a detailed survey of studies linking investor psychology to 
asset pricing and argues that this issue lies at “the heart of the grand debate in finance 
spanning the last two decades.” While a complete understanding of investor psychology 
requires familiarity with a wide range of individual and group behaviours, a few 
psychological traits are often recognized as highly influential in shaping investors decisions. 
The overconfidence effect clearly belongs to this list.  
The overconfidence effect, due to its broadness and importance, has been widely influential 
outside the field of psychology (see, among others, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 
1998; Statman, Thorley and Vorkink, 2006; and Garcia, Sangiorgi and Urošević, 2007). The 
role of overconfidence in influencing the behaviour of economic agents and, by extension, 
the functioning of financial markets, is an emerging, increasingly important and widely 
researched topic. In fact, it has been suggested that in the field of judgment and decision-
making, no problem is “more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than 
overconfidence” (Plous, 1993).   
To properly understand overconfidence, it is appropriate to start from the closely related 
concept of “optimism”. Optimism seems to be an integral part of the human psyche. From the 
perspective of evolutionary processes, it is proposed that optimism must have brought the 
early humans important benefits, and therefore, in the course of thousands of years of 
evolution, it has become part of the genetic hardwiring of the human brain. Apart from this 
evolutionary perspective, it is now widely known that humans constantly learn about 
themselves and their abilities by observing the consequences of their actions. In doing so, 
most people overestimate the degree to which they play a role in their own successes. This 
tendency is often amplified by an illusion of control, i.e. by thinking that one can control or 
influence an outcome. The overconfidence resulting from this mechanism can have several 
negative consequences for decision-making, as I will discuss in detail in the literature review. 
In fact, many researchers cite overconfidence as an explanation for wars, strikes, litigations, 
entrepreneurial failures and, not surprisingly, stock market bubbles (Glaser, Noth and Weber, 
2007; Moore and Healy, 2008).  
A large body of literature has more recently focused on the overconfidence of corporate 
managers, and its impact on corporate investment decisions in areas such as capital structure 
and M&A activity (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011; and Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011 among others). The 
questions asked in this chapter, however, concern the impact of overconfidence on 
professional investors, which is a far less studied topic. The underlying research questions are 
motivated by three large areas of literature, i.e. studies of mutual fund performance and 
persistence, studies of financial accounting narratives and business communication, and 
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studies of professional investor psychology. In particular, the following research questions 
are asked in this chapter:  
1. Can fund manager overconfidence be robustly measured through content analysis of 
investment narratives?  
2. How does a fund manager’s prior investment performance affect his or her 
overconfidence?  
3. Do fund managers strategically change the tone of their investment narratives to justify 
their prior investment outcomes and express views on future investment outcomes? 
As financial agents, professional investors often operate in an environment that is 
significantly different from the assumptions of conventional models. Conventional finance 
views financial agents in terms of “rational” actors in the marketplace who use formal 
methods of asset valuation in an attempt to identify those stocks or other assets which may be 
mispriced; even though, on the other hand, markets are viewed traditionally as efficient. In 
contrast, the world of the real investment manager is one where she is swamped by 
information, is subject to acute information asymmetry, is under intense competition, and, in 
the end, has to rely to a large extent on subjective judgment, intuition and “gut feeling”. 
Added to this are the many imponderables which are outside her control, may largely drive 
her investment performance, and are intangible from an external viewer’s perspective 
(Holland, 2009). Ultimately, the professional investment manager is required to do a job 
which is very difficult if not impossible to do, and is under constant threat of dismissal if the 
returns she earns are not deemed satisfactory.  
This chapter argues that such environmental forces can, in a subtle way and through time, 
feed into professional investors’ overconfidence, and indirectly affect how they make 
investment decisions. This chapter attempts to take a mixed methods research approach. Prior 
research has found significant potential in applying mixed methods research strategies in the 
accounting and finance domain. The key strengths of mixed methods research include both 
testing and building theories through extension of existing theories as well as convergence 
and contradiction of findings.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the background, the core constructs 
and variables, and discusses the challenges of measuring overconfidence. Section 3 
introduces the data and its sources, and provides relevant descriptive statistics. Section 4 
empirically explores how past investment performance affects the overconfidence of fund 
managers, and the genre and tone of their investment narratives. Finally, section 5 concludes 
the chapter, and discusses research implications as well as areas for further work. 
 
2. Background 
Humans constantly learn about themselves and their abilities by observing the consequences 
of their actions; and in doing so, most people overestimate the degree to which they play a 
role in their own successes. A number of constructs need to be clearly differentiated in this 
discussion. For example, Van den Steen (2002) provides a comprehensive categorization for 
this purpose: Self-serving attribution bias refers to the fact that people attribute success to 
their own dispositions and skills, while they attribute failure to external forces or bad luck; 
ego-centric or self-centric bias refers to the fact that individuals taking part in a joint 
endeavor relatively over-estimate their contribution to a good outcome; overconfidence 
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relates to the fact that people over-estimate the accuracy of their estimates and predictions; 
overoptimism refers to the fact that individuals tend to be overoptimistic about future events 
and the consequences of their actions; and finally, illusion of control relates to the fact that 
people think they have more influence than they actually do over the outcome of a random or 
partially random event.  
Prior psychology literature has produced two different types of explanation for 
overconfidence and its associated effects. From one perspective, these phenomena have been 
interpreted in the context of motivational biases, the argument being that individuals are 
motivated to hold unrealistically positive self-perceptions in order to increase their own 
happiness and well-being. The core assumption is, of course, that people seek to maximize 
their happiness in a utilitarian way. Alternatively, a different perhaps complementary view is 
put forward by cognitive psychologists who argue that people generally expect to succeed, 
and they often accept responsibility for their expected outcomes. Hence, in combination of 
the two effects, people tend be prone to self-serving attribution bias. 
Importantly, this self-serving attribution bias can, in turn, produce overconfidence. Gervais 
and Odean (2001) explain that investors may falsely attribute superior past performance to 
their own skill, and inferior past performance to chance, which produces overconfidence. 
Overestimation of one’s investment skill can, in this manner, result in excessive trading, as 
documented by Odean (1999). Despite the extensive literature examining attribution and 
overconfidence among ordinary individuals, corporate executives, traders, and retail 
investors, there are few studies that can claim to have examined the role of such biases in 
subsequent fund manager performance. In particular, due to the fact that the bulk of 
investment in financial markets is made by institutional investors, any link between a 
professional asset manager’s performance and her potential overconfidence or susceptibility 
to self-attribution bias can be of considerable importance, both to the academic literature and 
the investment industry.  
The overconfidence effect is commonly measured in psychology through laboratory-type 
experiments (for a review see Hoffrage, 2004; Eshraghi, 2012). However, few of these 
experimental approaches are robust when it comes to gauging investor overconfidence, not 
least because of issues concerning ecological validity. Thus, researchers often resort to 
indirect effects proxying for overconfidence among investors. For example, trading activity is 
a commonly used proxy of investor overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2000). However, 
while this measure clearly works for retail investors, it cannot be as easily used for fund 
managers. Fund managers do not necessarily engage in excessive trading due to 
overconfidence, rather they may have to increase their turnover after a rise in fund inflows, 
which usually follows good past performance. Putz and Ruenzi (2011) control for this effect 
in their examination of the turnover of US equity mutual funds over the period 1994-2004. 
The authors conclude that fund managers indeed trade more after good past performance, and 
their higher trading is driven by individual portfolio performance. This is consistent with 
superior past performance producing task-specific overconfidence. In a similar way, Chow, 
Lin, Lin and Weng (2009) examine a sample of equity mutual funds, and show that fund 
managers behave overconfidently conditional on prior performance. They also demonstrate 
that such behaviour deteriorates subsequent performance. However, one should note that 
other potential confounding factors may affect managerial trades, such as incentive for 
window-dressing, tax-management issues, preference for liquidity and changing investment 
styles to attract fund flows, thus reducing the robustness of trading activity as a proxy for 
overconfidence.  
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Another proxy recently used in the literature for measuring overconfidence is Active Share. 
Active Share refers to the share of portfolio holdings that differ from benchmark index 
holdings, and is introduced as a new measure of active portfolio management by Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009). Using this measure, Choi and Lou (2010) are able to show that mutual fund 
managers are typically susceptible to the self-serving attribution bias. However, Active Share 
is not a “clean” measure of overconfidence either. A similar set of confounding variables can 
influence the way fund managers choose to arrange their portfolios. In addition, defining the 
optimal benchmark portfolio against which to measure Active Share is not trivial.  
A more straightforward way of measuring overconfidence may, of course, be to examine the 
actual estimates and predictions of fund managers about their subsequent performance. Willis 
(2001), for examples, investigates annual earnings forecasts that are publicly released in 
conjunction with mutual fund manager stock recommendations, thereby finding evidence of 
excess optimism. Gort, Wang and Siegrist (2008) examine overconfidence using a similar 
method, and conclude that the pension fund managers in their sample provide too narrow 
confidence intervals when asked to forecast future returns or estimate past returns of various 
assets. However, since their approach requires questionnaire-type surveys attempting to 
measure fund manager confidence intervals, it cannot be readily used for a large sample of 
respondents and is subject to the usual robustness concerns associated with this type of 
secondary data collection.     
In this chapter, a novel approach for measuring professional investor overconfidence is 
suggested, i.e., studying the narratives in investment company annual reports. The three 
proxies for indirectly measuring overconfidence are overoptimism, excessive certainty and 
excessive self-reference. The Diction software is used to extract the first two variables. 
Predominantly, the optimism and certainty master variables are used. In Diction, optimism is 
defined as, “language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their 
positive entailments.” The formula used for calculating “net optimism” is: [praise + 
satisfaction + inspiration] - [blame + hardship + denial]; in other words, “optimism” minus 
“pessimism”. Diction defines certainty as “language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra.” The Diction formula for certainty is: 
[tenacity + leveling + collectives + insistence] - [numerical terms + ambivalence + self 
reference + variety]. I use the adjustment proposed in Demers and Vega (2010) to include 
numerical terms as adding to rather than subtracting from the certainty score.  
The third proxy used for overconfidence is self-reference which is defined as the normalized 
frequency of first-person singular and plural pronouns in each narrative (I, me, my, mine, we, 
us, our, ours), which can be derived from Diction with a simple calculation. One can also 
explore the possibility of constructing a meta-variable comprising some or all of the above 
overconfidence proxies. Since the face validity of these variables is debatable, the usefulness 
of such overconfidence meta-variable will be evaluated on an empirical basis. 
As explained above, the sample narratives are sourced from investment company annual 
reports. The importance of studying finance and accounting narratives is illustrated by the 
growing emphasis on the objectivity of accounting literature as a means of communicating 
financial performance. The narratives studied here merit close attention as they are essential 
parts of the organizational sense-making process among the firm’s stakeholders (Gabriel 
2000). 
In terms of structure and intended purpose, investment company annual reports are 
comparable to corporate annual reports. Stanton and Stanton (2002) cite a study which 
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demonstrates that corporate annual reports have become “a highly sophisticated product of 
the corporate design environment, the main purpose of which is to proactively construct a 
particular visibility and meaning rather than revealing what was there.” This is consistent 
with the inherent reflexivity of language, i.e. language both mirrors and constructs 
(construes) reality in a desired way Fairclough and Holes (1995). In other words, as Hines 
(1988) suggests, people create a picture of an organization, they think and act on the basis of 
that picture, and “by responding to that picture of reality, they make it so.”  
There exists a substantial body of literature examining corporate annual reports from various 
perspectives. Researchers often investigate sections of, or even the whole annual report and 
focus on themes such as impression management, marketing, organizational legitimacy, 
political economy, accountability, etc. Stanton and Stanton (2002) provide a comprehensive 
review of this vast literature by categorizing 70 of the most “useable studies” in the field. The 
focus of these studies has been extremely wide, with no one particular area dominating the 
attention of the cited authors.  
The annual report studies that investigate narratives and stories appear to agree on a number 
of shared patterns: the way a story is told by the narrator, as well as what the story says, both 
matter. Linguistic theory provides “a range of language choices and constructions that report 
preparers can use to pursue their goals without misinformation or complex language” (ibid) 
and, as such, the choice of verb structures, themes, subjects, context, cohesion and 
condensations all determine meaning, as Thomas (1997) explains. Just as importantly, 
narrative theories discuss different sets of factors that influence meaning, (Stanton and 
Stanton, 2002). These include the sources of meaning, the narrative structure, the reader 
interaction with the text, the existence of different narrators and different genres (modes of 
narration e.g. epistles, lessons, sermons, essays and question-and-answer dialogues).  
Prior research also concurs that language can often be used to obfuscate bad news and thus 
blur distinctions on the causes of poor performance. Courtis (2004) defines obfuscation as “a 
narrative writing technique that obscures the intended message, or confuses, distracts or 
perplexes readers, leaving them bewildered or muddled.” Narrators often achieve this effect 
through “the use of esoteric or obscurantist vocabulary and/or gobbledygook, extraneous and 
non-relevant information, long sentences with complex grammatical structures and/or high 
variability in reading ease, and convoluted and/or spurious argumentation.” 
I also take note of the methodology recommended for analysing CEO communication by 
Craig, Garrot and Amernic (2001) and Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010). The former study 
states that any attempt at “close reading” CEO narratives should reveal (1) the metaphors 
used by, (2) the ideology adhered to, and (3) the rhetoric implemented by the CEO as well as 
any (4) critical ‘silences’, (5) dichotomies and (6) false distinctions made by the executive. 
The latter study adds to this list (7) the CEO’s mindset and (8) the CEO’s attitude to risk 
exposure and risk management. In brief, managers are equipped with an increasingly 
“complex arsenal of communication tools” including selection and integration of narratives, 
language, images, graphs etc. to create, what Jameson (2000) calls, a hyperstructure that 
effectively engages the audience as part of the story. Finally, it is important not to forget that 
the narrator is an implicit audience of his or her own story.     
 
 
3. The Structure of Fund Manager Narratives 
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This section provides information about the sources as well as a general outline of the data 
used in this study. The mutual fund performance data used in this research is sourced from 
the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. This database, widely used in the 
finance and accounting literature, is designed to facilitate research on the historical 
performance of open-ended US mutual funds. It claims to be “the only complete database of 
both active and inactive mutual funds” and distinguishes itself by providing survivor-bias-
free data. The mutual fund annual reports are sourced from the Electronic Data-Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (hereinafter EDGAR), a publicly available database provided by the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC). It performs automated 
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance and forwarding of submissions by companies 
and, in some cases, individuals who are legally required to file forms with the SEC.  
It is important to discuss the issue of authorship of mutual fund annual reports. Firstly, 
according to the conventions in the mutual fund industry, fund managers often write their 
own reports and commentaries, which may then be edited by in-house editors only to check 
spelling and grammar, and to ensure presentational consistency with other sections of the 
annual report. In other words, the in-house editors are mostly concerned with the professional 
presentation of the annual report as a whole document and are much less concerned with the 
core thematic elements, sentence structure and other rhetorical features of the fund manager 
narratives. Secondly, similar to the prevailing practice in CEO communication, fund 
managers are signatories of their reports and assume legal responsibility for their content. 
Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010) argue that this acts as an incentive for them to closely 
scrutinise and approve the final version of the narrative before signature and publication. 
More importantly, they argue, “whether or not a CEO is actively involved in composing a 
letter to stockholders does not matter: the words in the CEO’s letter are symbolic and 
emblematic, and the reader takes them to be the CEO’s own.” Clearly, a similar proposition 
can be made about fund managers.  
The question of authorship can be further examined by investigating the variations between 
individual fund manager reports within the same investment company. This is because if we 
assume that the content of fund manager reports and the writing style of fund managers are 
substantially influenced by organizational factors or the role of in-house editors, one should 
expect to find a somewhat homogeneous set of fund manager narratives in each company’s 
annual report regardless of who the fund manager is. This, however, does not appear to be the 
case. In order to study the extent of cross-sectional variation in fund manager reports, I 
randomly select 50 such reports from five different investment companies. The results of 
cross-comparisons across a range of Diction variables as well as readability and tone indicate 
that there is indeed a significant level of within-sample variation that can be attributed to 
individual fund manager characteristics. A more robust test that would control for the types 
of funds in cross-comparisons can further confirm this observation. 
For illustration purposes, a sample fund manager narrative is provided below, extracted from 
the 2007 annual report of a large-cap equity mutual fund. From a sense-making perspective, it 
is interesting to observe how the fund manager seeks to manage the impression of the fund 
and its performance:  
 
 
“Dear Fellow Blue Chip 35 Fund Shareholder, 
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For the six months ending June 30, 2007, our Fund appreciated 4.04%, beating our primary market 
benchmark—quite an accomplishment in a market dominated by small- and mid-size stocks—but 
lagging our peer benchmark. The S&P 500 Index rose 3.16%, and the Lipper Large-Cap Core 
Funds Index rose 5.35%. Considering we had a “headwind” of almost two percentage points due to 
the size of our holdings versus our primary market benchmark, we are quite pleased. 
Even more positive was our relative performance in the market downturn of the full fiscal year 
ending June 30, 2007. While declining a significant 18.77%, we provided a sizable cushion relative 
to our performance benchmarks—just at the time when it counted the most (from a risk perspective). 
The S&P 500 Index declined 26.21% for the fiscal year, and the Lipper Large-Cap Core Funds 
Index declined 25.69%. Primary reasons for this outperformance were: a) a slight tailwind by way 
of company size on the way down, b) significant benefit from our “roughly equal weighted” 
indexing strategy, which performs particularly well in a precipitous market fall and recovery, c) a 
flight to “blue chip” quality in the first three quarters of the fiscal year, and d) a particularly well-
timed re-composition of Bridgeway Ultra-Large 35 Index in March, when we added Goldman 
Sachs, Schlumberger, McDonalds, and 3M Company; all have beaten the broader market since 
adding them. 
After strong large company dominating years in 2005 and 2006, small and especially ultra-small 
stocks came back with a vengeance in the June quarter. We were able to beat our primary market 
benchmark over the last six-month period in spite of this disadvantage. Since a primary determinant 
of our performance relative to the S&P 500 Index is size dominance, i.e. whether small or large 
stocks are leading in the marketplace, it is helpful to review this data often. Our informal goal is to 
outperform the S&P 500 in the vast majority of calendar years in which ultra-large companies beat 
ultra-small ones (We have done this every calendar year since inception) and (we believe, due to the 
structure of our index) in half the years that ultra-small ones beat ultra-large ones. This latter goal 
is no mean feat, but we have accomplished it in four of eight calendar years since inception and 
appear headed for another one in 2007. 
The primary reason for our strong six-month (January-June) period performance was our “roughly 
equal weighting strategy,” which requires us to invest more in the stocks that have gone down the 
most. Our quarterly rebalancing that took place in late March was fortuitously near the March 9 
market bottom. The stocks that had declined the most from July 2006 through early March 2007 
were typically the ones that bounced back the most in the June quarter. The recent market 
performance really showcased the advantages, especially by way of risk control, of our roughly 
equal weighting strategy (see section on risk below). An environment least friendly to this strategy 
would be a long and steady market appreciation, such as in the late 1990’s, or one of steady and 
prolonged decline. However, we hope our large company advantage would more than offset the 
weighting strategy disadvantage in some of these periods, as was true in 1998 and 1999. 
Our annual performance tells the story of a) the worst bear market in the last seven decades, b) one 
that was led by large financial stocks, and c) one that didn’t offer many places to hide. At the other 
end of the spectrum are three financial firms we might rather like to forget. We wrote up the 
experience of AIG in our semi-annual report in December 2006. In our March report, we wrote 
about McDonalds, “Personally, we don’t like adding a consumer non-cyclical company at what 
looks like might be a market bottom . . . but we follow statistical procedures which pretty much 
ensure this company is added.” So far, following the discipline of our process has worked out well, 
as the stock has outperformed the broader market in spite of a correct call (at least so far) on the 
direction of the market since March 31, 2007.” 
The sample of mutual funds used in this study covers all actively managed equity mutual 
funds with a unique manager and complete returns data for at least three consecutive years 
during the 2003-09 period. Annual reports with no substantial fund manager commentary, 
i.e., less than 200 words, are removed from this sample. Thus, for the purpose of the panel 
data analysis, I arrive at 4659 unique actively managed equity mutual funds that have a 
unique fund manager and complete returns data for at least three years during the sample 
period, and have corresponding fund manager commentaries. This yields the main sample for 
most of the empirical tests in this chapter. Table 1 reports summary statistics on the total 
actively-managed equity mutual funds that have a corresponding match in the CRSP 
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database. The statistics provided are related to the annual performance on an absolute basis, 
fund size, expenses and turnover. Definitions of these measures are also listed.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
This study specifically looks at optimism, certainty and self-reference of fund manager 
commentaries to infer the overconfidence of their corresponding managers. Table 2 
summarises the descriptives used in this study based on the main sample.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
I also calculate Pearson’s correlations between the overconfidence measures derived from the 
narratives and the risk factors embedded in the Carhart (1997) asset pricing model (see 
Eshraghi, 2012 for a discussion on this). Importantly, the cross-correlations between the 
overconfidence proxies suggest that optimism and certainty are to some extent associated 
measures of overconfidence (r=0.416) and they are both positively correlated with 
momentum (previous one-year return), i.e. a fund manager experiencing positive prior returns 
is likely to grow more optimistic about her future performance as well as more resolute in her 
tone of voice. There is a also significant correlation between optimism and self-reference 
(r=0.755) which is consistent with the expectations and the empirical evidence demonstrated 
in this chapter.  
In addition, the relatively low correlations between the proxies and the Carhart risk factors 
suggest fund manager overconfidence, as measured here, is not directly driven by any 
intrinsic fund characteristics and associated risk factors. Particularly in the case of 
momentum, one can argue that a large part of the variation in optimism is not explained by 
momentum. In other words, the implication is that the overconfidence measure used in this 
study is capable of capturing an effect distinct from other previously studied risk factors that 
influence investment performance.  
 
4. Overconfidence and Tone of Fund Manager Narratives 
In this section, I empirically investigate how past investment results influence fund manager 
overconfidence and tone. In order to test the impact of past investment performance on 
overconfidence, I rank the funds in each year on prior-year Carhart alphas and form decile 
portfolios. Then, I combine all the extreme (top and bottom) deciles across 2003-2009 and 
use the t-test with unequal variance to measure the difference between the two groups. The 
results are displayed in Table 3 (Panel A). I reiterate this analysis based on funds ranked by 
prior three-year alphas (Panel B).  
 
[Table 3 here] 
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It can be inferred that prior positive performance, both during the previous one-year and 
previous three-year periods, generates excess optimism as well as certainty as expected and 
the difference between the extreme deciles for both variables is significant at the 5% level. In 
fact, funds belonging to the top decile of Carhart alpha have a mean optimism which is, on 
average, about three standard deviations higher than the funds belonging to the bottom decile 
in the case of previous one-year alpha. The difference between the two deciles when funds 
are ranked by previous three-year alphas is similar but less pronounced. The effect of prior 
performance on fund manager certainty is also similar. The difference between the funds in 
the two extreme deciles in terms of self-reference is also significant in the case of previous 
one-year alpha and suggests that high-performing fund managers tend to refer to themselves 
more often their poor-performing counterparts. 
I also investigate the investment narratives from the perspective of genre theory. By studying 
the corpus-linguistic features of fund manager reports, I demonstrate how different groups of 
fund managers develop the core message in their narratives in very different ways (i.e. 
genres) in light of past performance. The notion of genre is grounded in organizational 
communications. Miller (1984) defines genre as “typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent 
situations.” Genres exist at different levels of abstraction, and can be identified in very broad 
as well as very specific contexts. For instance, Rutherford (2005) identifies the narrative 
section of UK corporate annual reports (also known as the Operating and Financial Review) 
as a middle-range genre of corporate communications between organizations and their 
stakeholders. In a similar way, I argue that the fund manager narratives can be treated as an 
impactful genre of corporate communication between the fund manager and the investors 
with its own distinct sub-genres. I use word-frequency analysis to demonstrate which sub-
genres exist in fund manager narratives and discuss their links to past and expected future 
investment performance. 
Word-frequency analysis is part of an increasingly versatile and modern methodological 
toolbox in corpus linguistics. As an empirical methodology, corpus linguistics seeks to 
analyse actual patterns of language use by employing a large, systematically organized body 
of texts known as the corpus (Rutherford, 2005). It can be used in textual analysis to 
distinguish between different genres, as well as explore features of individual genres. In the 
context of this research, word-frequency analysis is primarily used to identify the different 
sub-genres used in the fund manager’s communication of performance results. 
The sample used in this section consists of all actively-managed equity mutual funds with 
unique managers and complete returns data during 2003-09 that have significant fund 
manager commentaries in their annual reports. The average length of each fund manager 
commentary is 692 words (about two pages). Therefore, on average, the whole corpus under 
study consists of around 700,000 words for each year. 
I investigate the trend of certain corpus-linguistic features of fund manager commentaries 
throughout the sample period, and, in particular, focus on 2006 and 2008. These two years 
reflect, to a large extent, opposite snapshots of the overall economic environment affecting 
the mutual fund industry, as proxied by leading market indices. In other words, while 2006 is 
a sufficiently good proxy for a bullish year with regards to the US and global financial 
markets, 2008 can be treated as a bearish year in the same context. 
Based on the funds’ broad investment style denoted by their Lipper Objective Code, I 
subdivide the sample funds into two categories of value-oriented and growth-oriented funds. 
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Value-oriented funds normally seek a high level of current income through investing in 
income-producing stocks, bonds, and money market instruments. Growth-oriented funds 
normally invest in companies with long-term earnings expected to grow significantly faster 
than the earnings of the stocks represented in the major unmanaged stock indices. I also 
divide the funds, based on prior-year absolute annual returns into loss-making (negative 
return), least-profitable (bottom decile positive return) and most profitable (top decile 
positive return) categories. The number of funds in each category changes during the sample 
years. Finally, I divide the funds based on size (total net assets) into the smallest (bottom 
decile) and largest (top decile) categories. Hence, I end up with seven categories for the 
purpose of corpus-linguistic analysis. 
The first stage of the analysis explores the frequency of eligible words across all the sample 
annual reports. Similar to the methodology used by Rutherford (2005), the following word 
groups are excluded from the analysis in order to make a list of eligible words: (1) frequently 
occurring grammatical elements such as articles, conjunctions, pronouns, and common verbs; 
(2) days, months and years; (3) numbers, including monetary amounts, in words, figures and 
denominations. Rutherford also manually removes specific company and product names, but 
this is clearly not feasible in my much larger sample. However, these specific words should 
not introduce any significant bias in my analysis as they often include the name of the fund 
discussed in each commentary and therefore, in aggregate, are not expected to appear among 
high-frequency words. 
Table 4 lists the average 50 most frequently used eligible words across the sampled 
commentaries. I merge all the fund manager commentaries to arrive at a master corpus 
document for each year. Then, I determine the highest-frequency words in each year and 
average them across the years.   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The word “fund” is the most frequently used word in the corpus closely followed by the 
pronoun “we”. This is an interesting observation as the higher occurrence of the latter relative 
to the former may be an alternative proxy for self-reference and possibly even fund manager 
narcissism. I define a simple ratio by dividing the number of “we” instances by the number of 
“fund” instances for each narrative. For the whole sample, this ratio is equal to 0.824.1 Higher 
values of the ratio (particularly more than 1.016 which is one standard deviation larger than 
its mean) can signal fund manager narcissistic tendencies. As expected, this ratio is highly 
correlated (0.831) with my standard self-reference measure which looks at the frequency of 
all first-person singular and plural pronouns. 
 
Next, I investigate the linguistic features of the fund manager narratives through the sample 
years. The mutual fund industry experienced two rather distinct economic macro-
environments during the sample period, i.e. the bullish years of 2003-2006 and the bearish, 
volatile years of 2007-2009. In this context, it is interesting to observe the impact of the 
economy and other external factors on the lexical features of fund manager reports. Table 5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fund managers often tend to refer to their own fund under management in singular format and the competition 
or the industry in plural. Hence, instances of the word “funds” are not considered in calculating this ratio. 	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demonstrates a number of these measures and lists the 10 most frequently used words in the 
commentaries each year. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
A number of interesting observations can be made here. During the bullish years, with the 
exception of 2006, fund managers more frequently refer to themselves by mentioning “we” 
rather than the “fund”, while the reverse pattern emerges during the bearish years. The 
difference in word frequencies is significant at the 5% level using the t-test with unequal 
variance.  
 
Similarly, fund managers appear to write more frequently about their often “strong” record of 
“performance” or “growth” during the pre-2007 years. On the contrary, during the 2007-2009 
period, fund managers make more frequent citations of the “market” as well as the 
“economy”, possibly for the self-serving purpose of projecting relatively less glorious 
performance on external factors. The causation word “because” makes two notable 
appearances among the 10 highest-frequency words in 2007 and 2008. This can possibly be 
attributed to the fund manager’s preference to “talk him/herself out” of explaining an 
undesirable investment outcomes by advancing more causal arguments.2 The word “index” is 
also cited more frequently during the “bearish” years, for the likely reason of making relative 
performance comparisons. 
The frequency of individual keywords across different categories is also worth investigating. 
In making pair-wise comparisons, I use the Mann-Whitney U test, a powerful, non-
categorical, nonparametric test of between-subject differences, to find the differences 
between frequencies that are significant at the 5% level. Table 6 shows the frequencies of 
individual words on the consolidated 50 highest-frequency wordlist where there are 
significant differences in frequency among the seven groups of mutual funds. The word-
frequencies reported in Table 6 are averaged across the sample years and normalised based 
on a 10,000-word document. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
With regards to financial terms, “market” is more frequently used among funds with negative 
absolute returns, and the least profitable funds in the positive return category. The same 
pattern holds for “economy”. Although no firm conclusion can be drawn from this 
observation, it seems to suggest that fund managers, in aggregate, refer to the market and the 
economy as external performance detractors in a self-serving way, which is consistent with 
the anecdotal evidence based on close-reading mutual funds. The usage frequency of “index” 
yields a similar conclusion, i.e. fund managers tend to make benchmark comparisons more 
frequently when performance is in the negative domain, and in doing so they strategically 
shift the reader’s attention away from the fact that they have lost money by investing in the 
fund.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Li (2008) demonstrates that a higher frequency of causation words (such as “because”) in the Management 
Discussion and Analysis of corporate annual reports is associated with less persistent earnings. 	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In contrast, “performance” is used more often by the most profitable funds and less so by 
least profitable funds and loss-making funds. This can be due to the same self-serving 
attribution bias that leads fund managers to take ownership of favourable performance 
results. Not surprisingly, “growth” is used more frequently by growth-oriented funds, but also 
more so by most profitable funds. It is, however, difficult to attach significance to the latter, 
since “growth” may refer to a rise in assets as well as returns, both in the past fiscal year and 
the anticipated future. 
Continuing on to performance terms, we can observe that the triad of “strong”, “higher” and 
“positive” is used more frequently by the most profitable funds. However, the least profitable 
funds, and even loss-making funds do not use these terms much less frequently. This may be 
associated with the tendency of fund managers to report negative news in the false positive 
format (i.e. “the fund did not benefit from positive performance” instead of “our returns were 
negative”). In fact, the usage frequency of “not” is itself suggestive of the well-documented 
Pollyanna effect which can be defined as “the tendency to use evaluatively positive words 
more frequently and diversely than evaluatively negative words in communicating” (Boucher 
and Osgood, 1968). With regards to the usage of “profit(s)” and “loss(es)”, the results are 
similar to Rutherford (2005). Loss-making funds refer to profits more frequently than to 
losses, and they even make more references to profits than least profitable funds, which 
provides further support for the Pollyanna hypothesis. I will test the Pollyanna hypothesis 
more robustly later in this section. 
The use of self-reference terms in the commentaries is consistent with the pattern observed in 
the longitudinal study in Table 6. In other words, loss-making funds tend to use “fund” much 
more frequently than “we” while they begin to refer to themselves using a personal pronoun 
when performance improves. This is, of course, a clear manifestation of the self-serving 
attribution bias inherent, more or less, in all economic agents, and by extension, in 
professional investors. 
Finally, some other terms in Table 6 merit attention. Loss-making fund managers, compared 
to their counterparts who have returned a profit, tend to talk more frequently about lost 
“opportunities” as well “opportunities” for growth in the future. The same applies to growth-
oriented funds versus value-oriented funds. Loss-making funds managers also cite “long 
term” more frequently in comparison. Both of these observations may suggest the same 
strategy of focusing the reader’s attention on more positive messages. In addition, the word 
“because” is used more often in the negative domain, for the likely purpose of advancing 
causal arguments to justify sub-par performance.  
I also use Henry (2008)’s list of positive and negative words to search for instances of 
positivity/negativity in the study corpus using the same categories of funds in terms of 
performance, i.e., loss making, least profitable and most profitable. In addition, I explore two 
relevant categories, i.e., “up” words which generally connote growth or elevation and include 
“higher” “increase”, “increased”, “more”, “over” and “up”; and “down” words which include 
“decrease”, “decreased”, “lower”, “reduced” and “reduction”. The word frequencies are 
averaged across all the sample years and normalised for a document length of 10,000 words. 
The results are illustrated in Table 7. 
	  
[Table 7 here] 
	  
	  	  
14	  
The results reported in Table 7 suggest that positive words are more often used in fund 
manager commentaries than negative words (almost 2.4 times as much, which is slightly less 
than the 3 times proportion Rutherford (2005) found for corporate annual reports), which is 
another clear manifestation of the Pollyanna effect. This effect is stronger among loss-making 
funds compared to least profitable funds, i.e. the fund managers in the former group tend to 
use more positive words in order to “sugarcoat” the undesirable message they have to 
communicate to their clients in the commentaries. The results for “up” words and “down” 
words are similar.  
 
5. Discussion 
In this chapter, the dynamic relationship between the overconfidence of fund managers, the 
past performance of their funds and the tone of their investment narratives was studied. We 
observed that overoptimism and self-reference are likely to be more representative indicators 
of overconfidence than certainty, possibly due to the fact that fund managers commonly write 
their reports in a resolute tone by normal practice. The word frequency analysis of investment 
narratives demonstrated that key differences exist in the tone and genre of fund manager 
commentaries whose corresponding funds have experienced varying degrees of past 
investment performance. 
It is of course clear that fund managers do not operate in a context-free world. Holland (2009) 
identifies a number of important intangibles in the work environment of fund managers. 
These include: “1) increasing significance of knowledge intensive processes, assets or 
intangibles in creating value within the enterprise, and within its immediate network of 
corporate alliances, suppliers, distributors, and customers. 2) increasing use of technology 
within these value creation processes. 3) major changes in the corporate value creation 
process such that knowledge creation, articulation, processing and leveraging, has become a 
central survival activity for multinational companies. 4) changes in corporate structure from 
top heavy, multi layered managerial hierarchies to flat hierarchies, and to companies 
establishing alliance and networks with companies in the same industry and with suppliers 
and distributors. 5) increased internationalisation or globalisation of companies and 
industries. 6) radical changes in corporate strategy arising from the above forces.” 
Further research can address a number of limitations in the content analysis process. 
Fundamentally, content analysis is based on the assumption that the language people choose 
to express themselves in contains information about the nature of their psychological states. 
A large body of literature on narrative analysis, both in psychology and more specifically in 
the area of accounting and finance, is built on this core assumption. The alternative 
assumption, however, is that environmental circumstances may shape verbal and written 
communication in a way that may render the underlying psychological states of individuals 
untraceable.  
Firstly, a weakness of computer-assisted content analysis using the “bag-of-words” method is 
that word frequencies and word categories are relied on to imply intended meaning. This 
approach is of course not perfectly accurate, yet it is a compromise that allows researchers to 
analyse large amounts of textual data in a practical way. To circumvent associated problems, 
I have attempted to triangulate the results of computer-assisted analysis with manual coding 
and close-reading methodologies on random control samples of the annual reports.  
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Secondly, any content analysis program has to deal with the issue of homographs. While 
DICTION has a built-in feature that enables it to make context-dependent judgements on 
homographs, and therefore is superior to most other comparable packages, human coding can 
obviously lead to more accurate results.  
Thirdly, DICTION makes use of pre-defined dictionaries which may not always be perfectly 
tuned to specific research needs. The program also allows user-defined dictionaries that 
clearly increase flexibility. Although the current study has not taken advantage of this feature, 
this should not have contributed to any significant inaccuracy since almost all of the fund 
rankings and comparisons performed are within sample, and therefore such biases should 
have mostly cancelled out in the process.  
Fourthly, for each of the content analysis variables, DICTION specifies thresholds and 
declares values exceeding those thresholds as “out of range”, assuming a normal distribution 
for the underlying scores. While this is a useful feature, researchers should examine the 
distribution normality of the content analysis scores beforehand (a step taken in this study). 
More importantly, DICTION thresholds are by definition static whereas, ideally, the 
researcher can improve the accuracy of the results by defining dynamic thresholds for time-
series data depending on market environment and investor sentiment at any given observation 
date. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the sample mutual funds 
Absolute Return: Daily, monthly and annual returns values are calculated in CRSP as a change in NAV (net asset value) 
including reinvested dividends from one period to the next. NAVs are net of all management expenses and 12b-1 fees (12b-1 
fee denotes the ratio of the total assets attributed to marketing and distribution costs. It represents the actual fee paid in the 
most recently completed fiscal year as reported in the Annual Report Statement of Operations. Front and rear load fees are 
excluded). TNA: Total Net Assets as of the last trading day of each month, averaged for each year. Expense Ratio: Expense 
Ratio as of the most recently completed fiscal year. It represents the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the 
fund’s operating expenses, which include 12b-1 fees. Turnover: Fund Turnover Ratio. It is defined as the minimum of 
aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month Total Net Assets of the fund. 
 
Year 
 
Number 
 
Average Return  
(% per year) 
Total Net Assets 
($million) 
Expense Ratio 
(% per year) 
Turnover 
(% per year) 
2003 2169 30.2 295.2 1.5 86.3 
2004 2201 38.0 336.6 1.6 91.9 
2005 2287 32.6 385.0 1.4 105.2 
2006 2490 25.4 439.9 1.5 92.0 
2007 2355 -18.9 485.2 1.5 133.6 
2008 2612 -25.1 377.6 1.3 125.6 
2009 2549 -10.6 441.4 1.4 108.7 
      
Mean 2380 10.2 394.4 1.5 106.2 
Median  2355 25.4 385.0 1.5 105.2 
SD 173 27.2 65.9 0.1 18.9 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of overconfidence proxies 
This table reports the distribution of selected overconfidence proxies based on the content analysis of fund manager 
narratives, as well as positive/negative tone and readability. Optimism and certainty are computed by Diction, and certainty 
is adjusted according to Demers and Vega (2010). The optimism scores are based on the fund outlook section, the self-
reference scores are based on the past-performance discussion section and certainty scores are based on the whole narrative. 
 
 
 
Mean              SD Min         1st Quart Med         3rd Quart 
 
Max 
OPTIMISM 52.20 2.11 43.50 49.28 51.58 55.42 64.16 
CERTAINTY 47.25 1.37 44.39 46.14 46.92 48.15 51.97 
SELF-REFERENCE 1.13 0.18 0.74 0.99 1.04 1.28 1.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
3	  
Table 3. Variation of fund manager overconfidence in extreme portfolios sorted on prior Carhart alphas 
This table compares the top and bottom deciles formed by sorting the funds in each year on prior-year Carhart alphas and 
combining all the extreme deciles across 2003-2009. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels based on two-
tailed tests. 
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Table 4. Highest frequency eligible words commonly used in fund manager narratives 
Instances Frequency Word  Instances Frequency Word 
11312 1.63% Fund  2113 0.30% Holdings 
9323 1.34% We  1989 0.29% Opportunities 
7086 1.02% Year  1865 0.27% Current 
5967 0.86% Market  1865 0.27% Information 
5594 0.80% Performance  1740 0.25% Fiscal 
4973 0.71% Funds  1740 0.25% Fund's 
4973 0.71% Growth  1740 0.25% Industry 
3605 0.52% Investment  1740 0.25% Long-term 
3232 0.46% Interest  1740 0.25% Positive 
3232 0.46% Stock  1616 0.23% Inflation 
3108 0.45% Index  1616 0.23% Period 
3108 0.45% Sector  1492 0.21% Economic 
3108 0.45% Stocks  1492 0.21% Profit(s) 
2984 0.43% Companies  1492 0.21% New 
2984 0.43% Consumer  1492 0.21% Returns 
2984 0.43% Economy  1492 0.21% Return 
2859 0.41% Strong  1492 0.21% Services 
2859 0.41% Years  1367 0.20% Products 
2735 0.39% S&P  1367 0.20% Returned 
2735 0.39% Technology  1367 0.20% Shareholder 
2611 0.38% Prices  1304 0.19% Loss(es) 
2362 0.34% Past  1243 0.18% Because 
2362 0.34% Portfolio  1243 0.18% Business 
2362 0.34% Value  1243 0.18% Data 
2238 0.32% Believe  1243 0.18% Earnings 
2238 0.32% Higher  1243 0.18% Lower 
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Table 5. Corpus-linguistic features of fund manager investment narratives 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total words 
(tokens) 594 552 636 679 729 795 860 
Distinct words  
(types) 2049 1833 2232 2370 2223 2202 2511 
type/token  
ratio 3.45 3.32 3.51 3.49 3.05 2.77 2.92 
Words  
per sentence 9.8 10.2 9.5 11.0 12.4 13.9 13.5 
Characters  
per word 5.7 6.4 6.1 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.6 
        
10
 h
ig
he
st
-f
re
qu
en
cy
 w
or
ds
 
We We We Fund Fund Fund Fund 
Fund Fund Fund We We We We 
Performance Growth Performance Year Market Year Market 
Growth Investment Strong Performance Index Market Year 
Year Performance Growth Strong Economy Index Economy 
Stock Strong Investment Growth Investment Economy Funds 
Strong Stocks Believe Funds Because Sector Index 
Believe Market Market Higher Performance Value Investment 
Higher Funds Economy Stock Value Because Interest 
Interest Index Stock Market Funds Investment Stock 
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Table 6. Word-frequency analysis of positive and negative tone 
Words Loss-making  Least Profitable  
Most 
Profitable  Average 
Loss-making vs. 
Least Profitable 
Least Profitable vs. 
Most Profitable 
Loss-making vs. 
Most Profitable 
Positive words 625.6 618.1 735.2 626.5  * * 
Negative words 251.0 260.5 187.8 255.4   * 
“Up” words 118.5 115.3 129.7 120.2  *  
“Down” words 52.8 51.0 37.5 45.7   * 
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Table 7. Word frequency analysis of investment narratives belonging to different fund categories 
	  
 Word frequencies per 10,000 words Statistically significant differences in word frequency 
Words Loss-Making  
Least 
Profitable  
Most 
Profitable  Smallest  Largest  
Value-
oriented  
Growth-
oriented  Average 
Lo
ss
-m
ak
in
g 
vs
. 
Le
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t P
ro
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le
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vs
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s. 
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t 
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e 
vs
. 
G
ro
w
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Financial 
terms 
 
Market 105.6 70.4 54.6 64.0 98.8 79.3 82.1 86.2 * *  *  
Performance 65.2 90.1 102.9 85.5 79.9 66.4 81.3 79.7 *  *   
Growth 60.6 85.8 99.2 84.7 66.2 40.8 105.5 71.1   * * * 
Index 64.9 35.7 49.9 44.1 49.3 38.8 40.1 44.6 * *    
Performance 
terms 
 
Strong 37.2 43.0 49.1 35.5 39.8 30.3 48.9 40.8   *   
Higher 28.8 37.0 38.0 32.4 32.9 28.1 33.6 32.5 *  *   
Positive 20.0 30.9 35.5 22.0 24.4 20.4 27.6 24.5   *  * 
Profit(s) 34.1 16.7 35.9 21.7 24.4 18.0 21.3 21.4 * *    
Loss(es) 29.5 13.6 10.0 25.9 10.9 26.8 14.1 18.8 *  *   
Self-
reference 
 
Fund(s) 311.0 251.5 189.5 245.4 235.5 229.9 231.0 234.4 *  *   
We 76.6 135.1 199.0 145.2 151.7 156.7 125.4 133.7   *   
Other terms  
Opportunities 39.1 29.0 28.5 25.5 27.2 20.3 32.8 29.2   *  * 
Long term 40.4 32.5 21.4 25.9 22.2 21.3 28.3 25.0 *     
Because 30.6 25.2 15.9 14.4 20.3 19.6 26.9 18.3 *  *   
Not 38.6 25.0 19.9 27.1 27.3 22.6 26.9 24.4 *  *   
 
